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NOTES
DOES SECTION 524(a)(2) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
BAR CRIMINAL PROSECUTION CONCERNING
DISCHARGED DEBTS?
Because Congress explicitly intended section 524(a)(2) of the
Bankruptcy Code' to prohibit any act to collect debts discharged
in bankruptcy,2 the provision arguably bars creditors from pursu-
ing criminal prosecution of debtors to aid in their collection efforts.
Although bankruptcy law is intended to give a debtor a fresh start,
the policy of broadly construing bankruptcy laws to favor a debtor
is not meant to protect the dishonest debtor.3 Bankruptcy laws
should not be a safe "haven" for criminals.4 Thus, section 524(a)(2)
presents a tension between potentially conflicting state and federal
law and policies.5 In balancing the federal bankruptcy policy of af-
fording the debtor a fresh start with a state's right to prosecute
debtors who have violated state criminal laws, courts have reached
contradictory results.
State criminal prosecution of debtors to coerce collection of un-
paid debts is not a recent phenomenon.' Commentators and judges
have noted that creditors who are frustrated by the expansive dis-
charge provisions and automatic stay of the Bankruptcy Code have
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (1982). The Bankruptcy Code comprises all of title 11 of the
United States Code.
2. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 989], reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5866.
3. McMiUan v. Firestone (In re Firestone), 26 Bankr. 706, 719 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982)
(citing Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358 (1964)).
4. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 342 [hereinafter HR REP. No. 595], re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6299.
5. For a thorough discussion of areas of tension between federal bankruptcy law and state
law interests, see Lake, Conflict: The Bankruptcy Act v. State Statutes, 10 Loy. LA.L. REv.
753 (1977).
6. See Cohen, The History of Imprisonment for Debt and Its Relation to the Develop-
ment of Discharge in Bankruptcy, 3 J. LEGAL HIsT. 153 (1982).
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attempted to use state criminal laws to aid in their collection
efforts.7
This Note examines whether the policy underlying section
524(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code bars the criminal prosecution of
debtors in state courts. It first discusses the federal-state conflict
that arises when creditors file criminal proceedings in state courts
to collect debts discharged under federal bankruptcy law. By ex-
amining cases in which debtors have sought to use section
524(a)(2) as a shield against state prosecution, this Note then ana-
lyzes the approaches courts have taken to find an equitable bal-
ance between federal policy and state interest. This Note con-
cludes that courts should scrutinize the factual circumstances and
particular equities of each case in light of certain objective factors
to reach a just result. These factors have been expressed by
thoughtful courts that have struggled to accommodate the federal
interest of providing a fresh start without turning bankruptcy into
a haven for criminals and the state and public interest in criminal
prosecutions.
THE "FRESH-START" POLICY OF BANKRUPTCY
One of the primary purposes of federal bankruptcy law is to "re-
lease the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness
and permit him to start afresh free from the allegations and re-
7. See Whitaker v. Lockert (In re Whitaker), 16 Bankr. 917, 922 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1982). Bankruptcy Judge Paine stated that creditor use of the Tennessee bad check statute
to collect discharged debts was a "matter of common knowledge" and "ingrained" in the
state's criminal justice system. Id. For further discussion of state courts acting as debt col-
lection agencies, see Kratsch & Young, Criminal Prosecution and Manipulative Restitu-
tions: The Use of State Criminal Courts for Contravention of Debtor Relief, 1984 ANN.
SuRv. BANK. L.107, 108-09. See generally Hendel & Reinhardt, Inhibiting Post-Petition
"Bad-Check" Criminal Proceedings Against Debtors: The Need for Flexing More Judicial
Muscle, 89 Com. L.J. 236 (1984); Kratsch & Young, supra, at 107; Mehler, Criminal Prosecu-
tion and Restitution Under the Bankruptcy Code, 1983 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 817; Ostrow, The
Changing Nature of the Discharge in Bankruptcy, 1979 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 403; Schutz,
Bankruptcy and the Prosecutor: When Creditors Use Criminal Courts to Collect Debts,
FLA. BAR J., May 1985, at 11. Use of the state criminal process gives rise to three principal
concerns: a constitutional dilemma under the supremacy clause, an undermining of the
value of the debtor's discharge, and an unfair preference for those creditors who are able to
rely on a criminal statute. Kratsch & Young, supra, at 109-10.
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sponsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes."' The United
States Supreme Court first articulated this "fresh-start" doctrine
in Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,9 in which a federal court enjoined state
civil proceedings against a debtor. The Court in Local Loan de-
dared that the Bankruptcy Act gave debtors a "new opportunity
in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pres-
sure and discouragement of pre-existing debt."'1 The Court held
that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act should be construed in
harmony with this general purpose and policy.11 The fresh-start
doctrine retains primary importance in bankruptcy proceedings
today.2
Problems with Prior Statutory Provisions
Congressional endorsement of the fresh-start policy has been evi-
dent in many provisions of federal bankruptcy law. In an effort to
strengthen the effectiveness of the discharge in bankruptcy, in
1970 Congress passed section 32(f), which provides in part: "An
order of discharge shall ... enjoin all creditors whose debts are
discharged from thereafter instituting or continuing any action or
employing any process to collect such debts as personal liabilities
of the bankrupt."'
Congress's primary goal in passing this legislation was to prevent
creditors from harassing bankrupt debtors.14 Section 32(f) pur-
8. Williams v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915) (quoting
Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904)).
9. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
10. Id. at 244.
11. Cf. id. at 245 (when such construction is reasonably possible).
12. See, e.g. First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 11 Bankr. 683, 685 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1981).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 32(f)(2) (1970), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1502, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 [hereinafter HR. REP. No. 1502], reprinted
in 1970 U.S. ConD CONG. & ADAuN. Naws 4156, 4156. The legislation was enacted to attack
the problem of creditors bringing suit in state courts after a discharge in bankruptcy had
been granted in federal courts. The creditor would hope that the debtor would not appear in
the state action, as he often would not, due to misplaced reliance on the bankruptcy dis-
charge, lack of funds to retain an attorney, or improper service. Because the discharge was
an affirmative defense that was waived if not pleaded, a default judgment could be entered
against the debtor and he could be saddled with a garnishment or lien. Id.
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ported to give the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to determine
the effect of a discharge when granted. 15
Section 32(f) did not prevent harassment of debtors for dis-
charged debts, however. Several courts interpreted 32(f) to pro-
hibit only legal means of post-discharge debt collection. In In re
Thompson, e the court construed section 32(f) to mean that a
bankruptcy discharge did not prevent informal collection practices
such as threatening letters and threats of criminal prosecution. 7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas noted that the debt collection methods contravened the
fresh start purpose of the Bankruptcy Act, but found that the
creditors could not be "held in technical contempt of the bank-
ruptcy court's discharge order."' 8 In upholding lower court deci-
sions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
also has found that the 1970 amendments did not prohibit nonle-
gal, informal means of inducing a debtor to make payments on dis-
charged obligations. 9 The Eighth Circuit stated that the word
"process" in section 32(f) implied court action and the "activation
of the formal legal machinery of a government."20
Enactment of Section 524(a)(2)
Although not all courts interpreted the provision as technically
as the court in Thompson,2 ' Congress, in the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978, enacted section 524(a)(2)22 to replace section 32(f)(2).
15. HR REP. No. 1502, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 4156-57.
16. 416 F. Supp. 991 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
17. Id. at 996. The court in Thompson relied on legislative history stating that § 32(f) was
to eliminate "harassment lawsuits" in state courts. Id. (citing Bankruptcy Act Amendments,
116 CONG. REc. 34,818, 34,818-20 (1970)).
18. Id.
19. See Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267, 1272 (8th Cir. 1977).
20. Id. at 1272-73.
21. See, e.g., In re Penny, 414 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (W.D.N.C. 1976) (staying criminal
proceedings initiated to collect debts was the only way to effectuate judgments of the bank-
ruptcy court).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1982) states:
(a) A discharge in a case under this title ....
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of
an action, the employment of process, or any act, to collect, recover, or offset
[Vol. 29:579
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The purpose of section 524(a)(2) was to accord complete relief to
debtors.23 By insuring that once a debt was discharged, the debtor
would not be pressured to repay it, 24 the House intended section
524(a)(2) to eliminate any doubt concerning the effect of the dis-
charge as a total prohibition on debt collection efforts. 5 Section
524(a)(2) thus prohibits any attempt to collect debts, including
pestering telephone calls or letters, harassment, and threats of
repossession.
FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
The Younger Abstention Doctrine
When creditors attempt to use state criminal prosecution to col-
lect debts, a debtor often requests a bankruptcy court to issue an
injunction to halt the state court proceedings. Congress, however,
has limited the power of the federal courts to enjoin state proceed-
ings except in certain limited circumstances. 26 In Younger v. Har-
12ris, the Supreme Court recognized one additional basis for the
exercise of a federal court's injunctive power. If a person faced
with a state criminal prosecution can show that he or she will suf-
fer irreparable damage, a federal court can enjoin the state court
proceeding.2
The Court in Younger reaffirmed the fundamental policy against
federal judicial interference with state criminal prosecutions. This
general policy will not be disturbed except under extraordinary cir-
cumstances in which the danger of irreparable harm to the crimi-
any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from property of the
debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived.
23. Whitaker v. Lockert (In re Whitaker), 16 Bankr. 917, 921 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982).
24. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 366, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 6321.
25. See id., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6321.
26. "[A] court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress or where necessary in aid of
its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgment." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
27. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
28. Id. at 43. The Court in Younger stated: "[A] judicial exception to the longstanding
policy evidenced by [§ 2283] has been made where a person about to be prosecuted in a
state court can show that he will, if the proceeding in the state court is not enjoined, suffer
irreparable damages." Id. at 43 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
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nal defendant is "both great and immediate. 2 9 This threat to the
defendant's federally protected rights must be one that he cannot
abate by defending against the single criminal prosecution in is-
sue.3" The Court held that in the absence of a "showing of bad
faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstance" to justify
the granting of equitable relief, a federal court could not enjoin a
criminal prosecution pending in a state court.3' In the companion
case of Perez v. Ledesma,32 the Court elaborated on the Younger
test by stating that a federal court could enjoin a state criminal
prosecution only in cases of "proven harassment or prosecutions
undertaken without hope of obtaining a valid conviction and per-
haps in other circumstances where irreparable injury can be
shown."3 3
In the following year, however, the Court announced in Perez v.
Campbe ll 4 that the supremacy clause invalidated any state legisla-
tion that frustrated the full effectiveness of a federal law. The
29. Id. at 46 (citing Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926)).
30. Id. An exception to the general rule that a federal court has no jurisdiction to enjoin
state criminal proceedings occurs when a state action is brought to enforce an allegedly
unconstitutional statute that is the subject matter of a suit already pending in federal court.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908). An injunction was also granted in Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), to prevent substantial impairment of freedom of expressison
resulting from prosecution under an unconstitutionally broad statute. Id. at 485-89. The
appellants in Dombrowki prevailed on their claim that the State of Louisiana was invoking
criminal process without any hope of ultimate success, in order to discourage appellants'
civil rights activities. The Supreme Court in Dombrowski granted injunctive relief because
"no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statute in
a single prosecution." Id. at 491.
31. Id. at 54. Professor Redish maintains that Justice Black's analytical basis for federal
court restraint in Younger, "Our Federalism," has been justified at various stages of the
development of the Younger doctrine on four alternative bases of deference: (1) desire to
avoid impugning the ability of state courts to meet the obligations imposed on them by the
Constitution; (2) avoiding interference with substantive state legislative goals and policies;
(3) avoiding interference with the exercise of discretion by state executive officers, especially
state prosecutors; and (4) avoiding interference with the orderly operation of state judicial
processes. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale,
63 CORNELL L. Rlv. 463, 463-66 (1978).
32. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
33. Id. at 85. The Court did not indicate what "other circumstances" might compel an
injunction.
34. 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
35. Id. at 652. The Court overruled Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153
(1961), and Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941), two other bankruptcy cases dealing with
conflicts between the Bankruptcy Act and state laws. Id. at 652.
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Court in Campbell held invalid under the supremacy clause an Ar-
izona statute providing that a discharge in bankruptcy did not re-
lieve an individual from having his driver's license suspended if he
failed to satisfy a judgment resulting from a motor vehicle viola-
tion. The Court applied a two-step analysis, first construing the
applicable state and federal laws and then determining whether
these laws were in actual conflict.38 For the purpose of this deter-
mination, the effect of the law, not its stated purpose, was the cru-
cial factor.37 Under this analysis, any state legislation that frus-
trates the full effectiveness of a federal law is invalid under the
supremacy clause. The Arizona statute in question conflicted with
the mandate of the Bankruptcy Act, which provided that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy fully discharged all but certain specified
judgments." The Supreme Court in Campbell established that if
state law hindered the effective functioning of federal bankruptcy
law, the state law would yield. The Supreme Court did not address
the Younger abstention doctrine, however, which involves federal
interference with pending state court proceedings, not state
legislation.
The Younger abstention doctrine has received extensive and
continued criticism.3 9 Federal courts, however, continue to follow
the guidelines of Younger4 ° and Campbell41 when a debtor peti-
tions the court asking for an injunction halting state criminal
proceedings.
36. Campbell, 402 U.S. at 644.
37. Id. at 651-52.
38. See id. at 649.
39. See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Func-
tion, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1974). Professor Redish calls for the abolition of total and partial
judge-made abstention, arguing that the efficient workings of judicial federalism would not
be seriously undermined because courts would still be constrained by existing statutorily
dictated abstention and by the limits of the substantive federal rights being enforced. Id. at
74-75. See also Ziegler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative
History of Reconstruction, 1983 DuKE L.J. 987. Professor Ziegler contends that Younger and
its progeny directly contravene the intent of the Reconstruction Congress that adopted the
fourteenth amendment. He argues that by declining to exercise their powers, federal courts
are neglecting their duty to ensure that state justice systems function in a manner consis-
tent with the requirements of the federal constitution. Id. at 988-90.
40. See Gilliam v. Metropolitan Gov't, 67 Bankr. 83 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986).
41. See In re Hoffman, 65 Bankr. 985 (D.R.I. 1986); In re Wengert Transp., Inc., 59
Bankr. 226 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986).
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The Bankruptcy Court's Power To Stay Criminal Prosecution
The automatic stay provision, 11 U.S.C. § 362,42 is one of the
federal bankruptcy law's fundamental debtor protections. The stay
stops all collection efforts to allow the debtor time to formulate a
reorganization plan.4  The stay also protects creditors by prevent-
ing an unfair race for the bankrupt's assets and allows additional
time for development of an orderly and fair repayment schedule."
In subsection (b) of section 362, Congress specifically listed five
exceptions to the automatic stay. Although the proceedings listed
in the exceptions are not immune from injunction, Congress stated
that for reasons of either policy or practicality, the actions in the
enumerated exceptions generally should not be stayed
automatically.4
42. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of--
(1) the commencement or continuation, including issuance or employment of
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from
the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the
estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any
lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United
States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
43. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 6296-97.
44. See id. at 341, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6296-97.
45. Id. at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6298.
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Criminal prosecution of the debtor is one of the exceptions to
the automatic stay."' Although criminal prosecution is not auto-
matically stayed, the court may issue an injunction if it determines
that a particular action may be "harming the estate. '47 Further ev-
idence of the bankruptcy court's power to stay criminal prosecu-
tion can be found in the legislative history of section 362, which
states that "criminal actions may proceed in spite of bank-
ruptcy."4 8 Section 362 thus does not prohibit debtors from seeking
an injunction against criminal prosecution, but the debtor has the
burden of demonstrating the need for an injunction.
Most courts addressing the issue of criminal prosecution of debt-
ors have indicated that the bankruptcy court's authority to pro-
scribe criminal prosecution derives from 11 U.S.C. § 105(a). Sec-
tion 105(a) states: "The court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provi-
sions of this title. '49
Enmeshed in the tension between sections 362(b)(1) and 105(a),
is the specific question whether section 524(a)(2) bars criminal
prosecution of debtors for discharged debt.5 Unlike the automatic
stay provisions, section 524 contains no explicit exceptions. This
distinction has led some courts to infer that even a criminal pro-
ceeding to collect a discharged debt violates section 524.1 Despite
the statutory differences, courts often apply basically the same an-
alytical approach whether the debtor seeks injunctive relief under
section 105(a), section 524(a)(2), or both.2 Case law overlaps and
relevant distinctions between cases are not always clear.
46. Subsection (b) provides: "[Tihe filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of
this title . . .does not operate as a stay (1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the
commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor." 11
U.S.C. § 362(b).
47. H.R REP. No. 595, supra note 4, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 6298.
48. Id. (emphasis added), reprinted in 1978 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6299.
49. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1982).
50. For an informative analysis of the conflict between sections 362(b)(1) and 105(a), see
Mehler, supra note 7, and Kratsch & Young, supra note 7.
51. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Metropolitan Gov't. (In re Gilliam), 67 Bankr. 83 (Bankr. M.D.
Tenn. 1986).
52. See, e.g., Seidleman v. Texas (In re Seidleman), 57 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986)
(applying bad-faith test in considering whether to grant a debtor injunctive relief under §
105(a)); Bratten v. Sciortino (In re Bratten), 55 Bankr. 577 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985) (applying
19881
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ANALYTICAL APPROACHES TO SECTION 524(A)(2) AND CRIMINAL
PROSECUTION
The courts have taken two basic approaches in evaluating debt-
ors' pleas for injunctive relief from state criminal prosecution: a
"motivation-based" or "purpose of the prosecution" test and a
"bad faith-irreparable harm" standard derived from Younger.
The Principal Motivation Test
A court applying the principal motivation test looks to the moti-
vation behind the criminal prosecution. The federal bankruptcy
court will not usually interfere with the state criminal process
when the criminal prosecution has been instituted primarily to vin-
dicate the rights of the public by punishing criminal conduct or to
discourage such conduct by others.83 When the principal motiva-
tion is not punishment or prevention but recovery of a discharged
debt either by negotiating a plea to a lesser offense in exchange for
debt repayment or getting a restitution order after conviction, the
bankruptcy court may enjoin prosecution. 4
In applying the motivation test, courts focus on several objective
factors. These include the timing of the prosecution, specifically
whether the state initiated the prosecution after the debtor filed a
petition in bankruptcy;55 the negotiations between the parties, in-
cluding whether the state informed the debtor charges would be
dropped upon payment of the amount owed;56 the active interest of
bad-faith-irreparable-harm test when debtor sought injunctive relief on basis of discharge
effect of § 524(a)(2)).
53. See In re Caldwell, 5 Bankr. 740, 742 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
54. See, e.g., Kaping v. Oregon (In re Kaping), 13 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981). Many
courts have also applied the motivation test in § 362(b)(1)-105(a) cases. See Holder v. Dot-
son (In re Holder), 26 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); Wise v. Ritter (In re Wise), 25
Bankr. 440 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982); Ohio Waste Servs., Inc. v. Fra-Mar Tires Servs., Inc. (In
re Ohio Waste Servs., Inc.), 23 Bankr., 59 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); Strassmann v. Du-Art
Foods, Inc. (In re Strassman), 18 Bankr. 346 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); Wagner v. Miller (In re
Wagner), 18 Bankr. 339 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Lake, 11 Bnkr. 202 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1981); Reid v. Young (In re Reid), 9 Bankr. 830 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1981); In re Cald-
well, 5 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980); In re James, 10 Bankr. 2 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
1980).
55. See Salecki v. Virginia (In re Salecki), 51 Bankr. 364, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985).
56. See Whitaker v. Lockert (In re Whitaker), 16 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982).
[Vol. 29:579
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the state in pursuing the criminal actions;57 and the history of sim-
ilar proceedings in the area. 8
In Kaping v. Oregon,59 the debtor owed over $16,000 to the State
of Oregon for child support payments when he filed his bankruptcy
petition in March 1980. On June 19, 1980, the court granted the
debtor a discharge in bankruptcy. In April 1980, however, the
debtor was indicted for criminal nonsupport.60
In attempting to determine the motivation behind the prosecu-
tion, the court noted that the arguments of counsel were not par-
ticularly helpful in determining the creditor's subjective motiva-
tion.61 The district attorney argued that the case was brought to
punish the defendant and deter others, whereas the debtor's attor-
ney argued that the case was brought primarily to recover the al-
ready discharged debt for past due support. 2 Rather than adopt-
ing either view of the conflicting evidence, the court examined the
sentencing orders in twenty-nine other criminal nonsupport cases.
In the overwhelming majority of these cases, the court had ordered
restitution rather than jail.'3 The court in Kaping concluded that
the "principal motivation behind prosecutions for criminal non-
support is to obtain restitution and secondarily to obtain a period
of probation to ensure payment of future support as it becomes
due. '64 Because the motivation behind the state prosecution was
directly contradictory to the purpose of the federal bankruptcy
laws, the court permanently enjoined the state from further crimi-
nal prosecution of the debtor.
Critics of the motivation test point to its subjectivity because it
lacks a consistent standard that can be applied uniformly.65 The
court in Kaping recognized that any statements by the debtor and
57. See Salecki, 51 Bankr. at 368.
58. See Whitaker, 16 Bankr. at 922.
59. 13 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
60. Id. at 622.
61. Id. at 623.
62. Id.
63. Of the 22 cases that did not involve a prior probation violation, all but one ordered
payment of past due support (restitution), and only four resulted in jail sentences ranging
from 20 days to 4 months. Id. at 623.
64. Id. at 624.
65. See Kratsch and Young, supra note 7, at 119; Mehler, supra note 7, at 825.
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creditor concerning the purpose of the prosecution would be self-
serving and thus of dubious reliability in determining motivation."
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh and Third
Circuits have further undermined the viability of the motivation
test by relying on the bad faith-irreparable injury test in cases
involving a debtor's efforts to obtain injunctive relief from criminal
prosecution under section 105.67 Both courts have required the
debtor to show either irreparable injury or prosecution in bad
faith. The Third Circuit in Davis v. Sheldon65 specifically rejected
the debtor's argument that the inquiry should focus on whether
the creditors were motivated by a desire to collect on a discharged
debt. 9 The court in Davis, however, noted explicitly that the debt-
ors were not claiming injunctive relief under section 524(a)(2); the
court therefore did not address the applicability or scope of that
section.70 Other courts, however, have used the principal motiva-
tion test in construing section 524(a)(2).71
The Bad Faith-Irreparable Harm Test
The second approach courts have taken when asked to enjoin
criminal prosecution by a debtor derives from the Supreme Court's
decision in Younger v. Harris.2 Under this approach, a court will
enjoin a criminal prosecution only if the debtor shows that the
prosecutor initiated the criminal proceeding in bad faith or if the
debtor will suffer irreparable injury from the criminal proceeding.73
66. Kaping, 13 Bankr. at 622.
67. See Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 691 F.2d 176 (3d. Cir. 1982); Barnett v. Evans, 673
F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1982).
68. 691 F.2d 176 (3d. Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 178.
70. Id. at 179 n.8.
71. See In re Goodman, 34 Bankr. 23 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983). The court held a creditor in
contempt for causing the arrest of a debtor after discharge because the creditor knowingly
and intentionally violated §§ 362(a)(6) and 524(a)(2). Id. at 276. See also Salecki v. Virginia
(In re Salecki), 51 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985). In Salecki, Bankruptcy Judge Shelley
acknowledged that the United States District Court for the District of Maryland had over-
turned a bankruptcy court's application of the principal motivation test in Taylor v. Wid-
dowson (In re Taylor), 44 Bankr. 548 (D. Md. 1984), rev'g 16 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. D. Md.
1981), but stated that under either test no injunction was required by the circumstances.
Salecki, 51 Bankr. at 367 n.5.
72. See supra notes 27-41 and accompanying text.
73. See Wilson v. Estes (In re Wilson), 30 Bankr. 91, 98 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
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The focus shifts from the creditor's motivations to the prosecutor's
intent. A defendant can show bad faith when a prosecuting attor-
ney has reason to doubt the validity of the charges, when he fails
to exercise independent judgment in continuing the prosecution, or
when the complaining witness has insufficient evidence to support
the allegation.74 This approach has also been criticized as being
subjective and susceptible to widely disparate interpretations re-
garding what constitutes bad faith and irreparable harm.
Many courts have followed this approach in deciding whether to
grant injunctive relief to a debtor under section 105. 75 The accept-
ance of this approach by the Third and Eleventh Circuits may por-
tend a trend toward the acceptance of the bad-faith test over the
motivation approach.7"
The bankruptcy court in In re Allman77 stated that a federal
court should not enjoin a criminal proceeding merely because the
action concerned a debt that had been discharged in bankruptcy
proceedings. The court in Allman considered both the primary mo-
tivation and bad-faith prosecution tests and adopted the latter ap-
proach. Relying principally on the Third Circuit's opinion in Da-
vis" and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Barnett v. Evans,"9 the
bankruptcy court stated that the bad-faith prosecution test was
the better view for three reasons. First, the approach in Davis rec-
ognized the valid state interests in a criminal prosecution and ac-
knowledged that a federal court could not shield a debtor from a
74. Allman v. Merit Brass Co. (In re Allman), 43 Bankr. 840, 848 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984).
75. See, e.g., Davis v. Sheldon (In re Davis), 691 F.2d 176 (3d. Cir. 1982); Barnett v.
Evans, 673 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1982); Tenpins Bowling, Ltd. v. Alderman (In re Tenpins
Bowling), 32 Bankr. 474 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1983); Lae v. Norton (In re Lare), 24 Bankr. 959
(D. Md. 1982). But see Richardello v. Garrick (In re Richardello), 28 Bankr. 344 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1984); Trail West, Inc. v. South Dakota, 17 Bankr. 330 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982).
76. See, e.g., Seidleman v. Texas (In re Seidleman), 57 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986);
In re Jerzak, 47 Bankr. 771 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985); Frances v. Reno (In re Frances), 44
Bankr. 1016 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); but see Hansen v. Washington (In re Hansen), 48
Bankr. 107 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1985) (applying primary motivation test).
77. 43 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984).
78. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
79. 673 F.2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1982). Circuit Judge Roney stated that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) did
not give a bankruptcy court the authority to ignore the principles of Younger v. Harris. The
court was not concerned that one effect of conviction and imposition of restitution was the
collection of a discharged debt. Rather, the court focused solely on the Younger test to
determine whether an abuse of the criminal process had occurred. Id. at 1251-52.
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good-faith prosecution."s Second, the Davis approach allowed a
bankruptcy court to recognize that a state court would not ignore
the protection of the debtor in bankruptcy, but would fashion re-
lief that would protect the debtor's rights to discharge debts.8 " Fi-
nally, this approach limited the intervention of federal courts in
state court proceedings to situations in which a bad-faith prosecu-
tion could be shown."2
The bad-faith test has been criticized as being "simply ineffec-
tual in bringing about the protection of debtor's rights."8 " The
court's application of the bad-faith test in Wilson v. Estes (In re
Wilson) 4 to determine whether to grant injunctive relief to a
debtor under section 524(a)(3) supports this criticism. A hearing in
January 1983 revealed that the State of Tennessee had had little
or no interest in criminally prosecuting the debtor and had ap-
pointed the creditor's attorney as a special prosecutor to pursue
the case."' A letter from the special prosecutor/creditor's attorney,
in response to a proposed settlement by the debtor's attorney, pro-
vided further evidence that the creditor was using the criminal
prosecution as a debt collection device.88
Despite the state's lack of interest in pursuing the criminal pros-
ecution, the appointment of creditor's attorney as a special prose-
cutor, and the evidence that the criminal prosecution would have
been suspended if Wilson had tendered payment for his discharged
debt, the bankruptcy court in Wilson refused to find bad faith on
the part of the prosecution. Instead, the court relied on an affidavit
80. In re Allman, 43 Bankr. 840, 846 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Kratsch and Young, supra note 7, at 118.
84. 30 Bankr. 91 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983). The debtor, Wilson, filed for bankruptcy in
late May 1980. In July 1980, creditors filed a criminal complaint against Wilson, seeking to
except from Wilson's discharge in bankruptcy the aggregate amount of the mechanics' and
materialmen's liens filed by Wilson's subcontractors against their property. The creditors
allegedly had paid Wilson $34,000 for construction of a home; however, only a portion of the
amount paid was used for construction work, giving rise to the liens against the creditors'
property. Wilson's motion for summary judgment was granted on July 27, 1981. The bank-
ruptcy court granted Wilson a discharge on September 23, 1981. Id. at 93-94.
85. Id. at 94.
86. The letter stated, "In accordance with our conversation of February 17, 1982, I must
reject your offer of $7,000.... If Mr. Wilson could come up with $6,600 more, the case can
be resolved." Id. at 95.
[Vol. 29:579
SECTION 524(a)(2)
from a state prosecutor stating that the action was not an attempt
to collect a civil debt. 7 Certainly the state prosecutor had "reason
to doubt the validity of the charges" and perhaps failed to "exer-
cise independent judgment in continuing the prosecution."88 In an-
other Tennessee case, the bankruptcy court in Whitaker v. Lockert
(In re Whitaker)"9 ruled that although the prosecution of the
debtor was not in bad faith, continuation of the criminal action
would result in irreparable harm to the debtor.90 In Whitaker, the
creditor initiated criminal proceedings against the debtor sixteen
months after the debtor had written bad checks and three months
after the debtor had received a discharge from debts. The court
held that by its language, section 524(a)(2) prohibited the creditor
from receiving any payment of the discharged debt as a result of a
criminal proceeding.9 1 The court noted that the purpose of section
524(a)(2) was to "accord complete relief."92 Allowing payment of a
discharged debt as a result of criminal prosecution would defeat
this purpose and hinder the debtor's fresh start in bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy court in Whitaker distinctly separated the
questions of issuing injunctions against the creditor and against
the state. The state criminal prosecution was not enjoined on the
basis of section 524(a)(2). Rather, the court applied the test enun-
ciated in Younger and determined that the debtor would suffer ir-
reparable injury as a result of the criminal prosecution. The court
reasoned that because section 524(a)(2) prohibited the creditor
87. The affidavit stated in part:
Given the nature of defendant's crime, I determined that restitution was a
proper and necessary element in any pretrial diversion program for defendant.
That decision was not an attempt to collect a civil debt from defendant, for
any party, but was rather an attempt to impose conditions showing defendant's
suitability for a diversion program. It was felt that if defendant would escape
criminal prosecution through a diversion program, than [sic] defendant should
show his willingness to correct the wrongful effects of his actions.
Id. at 97-98.
88. See Allman v. Merit Brass Co. (In re Allman), 43 Bankr. 840 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984);
supra text accompanying note 68.
89. 16 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982).
90. Id. at 922.
91. Id. at 921.
92. Id. (citing Layfield v. Director of Pub. Safety (In re Layfield), 12 Bankr. 846 (Bankr.
N.D. Ala. 1981)). See University of Alabama Hosps. v. Warren (In re Warren), 7 Bankr. 201
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1980).
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from receiving any payment on the discharged debt, the statute
precluded the state from striking a deal whereby the criminal
charge would be dropped upon payment of the debt. The court
stated:
These circumstances effectively place the debtor between the
proverbial 'rock and a hard place'. Any payment by the debtor
to the creditor Martin is contrary to the order of discharge
which the debtor received .... Yet, if the debtor refuses to pay
the discharged debt, he faces the cost and anguish of a criminal
trial with the ultimate possibility of a prison sentence. The
debtor's anomalous predicament necessitates the issuance of a
permanent injunction against the district attorney. 3
The bankruptcy court expressed concern that the criminal defend-
ant/debtor, when faced with the legal costs of defending a felony
prosecution and the uncertainty of a jury verdict, would, even if
innocent, accept a settlement offered by the prosecutor. The court
expressly declined to put a debtor in this dilemma.9 4
A comparison of Wilson and Whitaker indicates that the appli-
cation of the bad faith-irreparable harm test may lead to incon-
sistent results. A debtor's injunctive relief may well depend not on
the merits of his case but on where the suit is filed.
Applying the Principal Motivation and Bad-Faith Tests Together
Perhaps the best approach when balancing the rights of the
debtor and the interests of the state under section 524(a)(2) is re-
flected in Redenbaugh v. Gahle (In re Redenbaugh)9 5 The court
first applied the principal motivation test in determining whether
to enjoin the creditor from using criminal prosecution to collect a
debt, and then asked whether the state was acting in bad faith in
prosecuting."'
The debtor in Redenbaugh issued two bad checks to the credi-
tor/complaining witness in March 1981. On October 7, 1981, the
debtor filed for bankruptcy. Although the creditor received notice
of the last day to file objections to the debtor's discharge, he ne-
93. Whitaker, 16 Bankr. at 922.
94. Id. at 922-23.
95. 37 Bankr. 383 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1984).
96. Id. at 387.
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glected to file an objection. On February 10, 1982, the court dis-
charged the debtor in bankruptcy. In May 1982, the creditor re-
quested that the state file criminal charges against Redenbaugh
and the court found probable cause at a preliminary hearing to
pursue the prosecution. The debtor sought injunctive relief pursu-
ant to sections 524(a)(2) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code2 7
The court in Redenbaugh decided that the best course to follow
was not to enjoin the state criminal action but to prohibit the cred-
itor from receiving any form of restitution ordered by the state
court 9 8 Recognizing that the creditor's motivation in pursuing the
criminal action was to collect a discharged debt,9 the court en-
joined the creditor from receiving any portion of his discharged
claim because he was "attempting to collect his debt by way of the
state court criminal proceedings, when the only place he can have
the debt found to be non-dischargeable and therefore collectable,
is in the bankruptcy court."'100
The bankruptcy court in Barnett v. K-Mart'0 went even fur-
ther. The court in Barnett did not look at the creditor's motivation
in pursuing the prosecution, but held simply that any order to
make restitution of a discharged debt would directly conflict with
and obstruct the purposes of federal bankruptcy law, and thus
would be void under the supremacy clause. 0 2 Accordingly, a credi-
97. Id. at 385.
98. Recognizing the strong policy considerations pitted against each other, the court
looked at other decisions concerning whether a discharge in bankruptcy prohibited criminal
prosecution. These other courts pursued several different tacks. Some courts recognized that
federal courts are hesitant to enjoin a state criminal action but determined that under the
circumstances an injunction was warranted. Others recognized that the Bankruptcy Code
encourages granting a debtor a "fresh start" but held that the Code did not provide author-
ity to enjoin the state action. A third group recognized the federalism and "fresh start"
policies and held that the state criminal action would not be prohibited from accepting any
form of restitution from the state court. Id. at 386.
99. Id. at 387. Judge Lessen stated that the case at bar was similar to Barnett v. K-Mart
(In re Barnett), 15 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). See In re Holder, 26 Bankr. 789
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982); Johnson v. Lindsey, 16 Bankr. 211 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
100. Redenbaugh, 37 Bankr. at 387 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523).
101. 15 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
102. Id. at 510. The court declared:
If a bankruptcy court discharges a debt, the Bankruptcy Code prohibits any
act to collect.., any such debt,... and thus the civil remedy of restitution,
even if arising out of a criminal proceeding, is prohibited. The creditor cannot
request restitution or direct the county attorney to request it, and the county
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tor arguably is barred per se from receiving any portion of a dis-
charged debt resulting from a criminal prosecution of a debtor.10 3
The state interest in enforcing criminal statutes is protected be-
cause the state prosecuting attorney is still free to pursue criminal
penalties.
Enjoining Prosecution
The court in Redenbaugh declined to enjoin the criminal prose-
cution because the defendant offered no evidence to indicate that
the state prosecutor had acted in bad faith. 04 The court did, how-
ever, hold that section 524(a)(2) prohibited the state's attorney
from recommending to the state court that the debtor pay restitu-
tion as part of a sentence or condition of probation.10 5 The court in
Barnett employed a similar rationale, explicitly relying on the
Younger doctrine.1°0 The court stated that state prosecution would
be enjoined when the prosecution was in bad faith, was improvi-
dently brought, or was used to harass the debtor.10 7
Given the persistence of the Younger abstention doctrine, one
might surmise that debtors have a virtually insurmountable bur-
den to show either bad faith by the prosecutor or irreparable in-
jury to themselves. Recent decisions reveal, however, that the bad-
faith test is not being applied perfunctorily. Rather, courts are ap-
plying the bad-faith test in a fair and equitable manner, protecting
the debtor when warranted. The court in In re Jerzak'0 recog-
nized that the exercise of its power to enjoin criminal proceedings
under section 105(a) was tempered by a recognition of the fact that
attorney cannot recommend it. The federal Bankruptcy Code, by virtue of the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause, forbids it, and this Court can and will enjoin
any such requests or recommendations.
Id. (emphasis in original).
103. One commentary calls this the most satisfactory approach taken by bankruptcy
courts. Kratsch & Young, supra note 7, at 119-20. The authors contend that the noninter-
ference and federalism aims of Younger as well as the punishment needs of society can be
met through this approach. Id. at 120.
104. Redenbaugh, 37 Bankr. at 387.
105. Id.
106. 15 Bankr. at 511.
107. Id.
108. 47 Bankr. 771 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
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every good-faith criminal proceeding should be protected."0 9 The
court enjoined the state action in Jerzak because the state prose-
cuting authorities had failed to exercise independent judgment in
continuing the prosecution.110 A district attorney had requested his
counterpart in another county to issue a criminal complaint
against the debtor. The court stated, "The conclusion is ines-
capable that the criminal aspect of Mr. Hogan's prosecution is
nothing more than an afterthought of the Lincoln County District
Attorney and that the Oneida County criminal proceeding is, but
for the caption, a civil action to collect a debt." ' The bankruptcy
court in Seidelman v. Texas (In re Seidelman), 112 after determin-
ing that the United States Bankruptcy Code was an expressly au-
thorized exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,1 s enjoined the pros-
ecution on the grounds of bad faith. The court condemned the
actions of the bank creditor and stated that the county prosecu-
tor's apparent lack of knowledge of the bank's "machinations" did
not immunize it from "the taint of bad faith and illegality." 1 4 The
court concluded that state action was invoked improperly to de-
prive a debtor of his right to a discharge in bankruptcy and that
the debtor would suffer irreparable harm if the court did not grant
injunctive relief.115
Sometimes a court does not simply accept a self-serving state-
ment by a prosecutor that a case is not being prosecuted to collect
a debt,116 but makes an objective determination based on the evi-
109. Id. at 773.
110. Id. at 773-74. The court relied on the bad-faith test stated in Davis v. Sheldon, 691
F.2d 176, 179 (3d. Cir. 1982), that "a criminal proceeding is not brought in good faith when
the complaining witness has insufficient evidence to support the allegations, when the prose-
cuting authority has reason to doubt the validity of the charges, or when the prosecutor fails
to exercise independent judgment in continuing the prosecution." Id. at 773.
111. Jerzak, 47 Bankr. at 774.
112. 57 Bankr. 149 (Bankr. D. Md. 1986).
113. Id. at 153 (citing S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 29, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 5815). The Anti-Injunction Act states: "A court of the United
States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly
authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction or to protect or
effectuate its judgments." Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1982).
114. Seidelman, 57 Bankr. at 155.
115. Id.
116. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
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dence and testimony presented.117  The use of the bad
faith-irreparable injury test to determine whether to enjoin the
state's criminal prosecution may be an effective, though imperfect,
way to balance the debtor's rights and the state's interests.
Prohibiting Restitution
The courts in Barnett v. K-Mart" 8 and Redenbaugh v. Gahle"9
suggest that the most satisfying solution to afford a fresh start to
the debtor and preserve the state's interest in enforcing criminal
statutes is to prohibit the creditor from receiving any restitution
imposed as part of a debtor's criminal sentence. The application of
section 524(a)(2) thus would not cause any federal interference
with state autonomy because the prosecutor could still seek impris-
onment or a fine. In Robinson v. McGuigan,'20 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invalidated a sentence im-
posing restitution as a condition of probation. The court in Robin-
son held that criminal restitution was a dischargeable debt under
section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 2' Other courts have held that
the debtor's fresh start is undermined if he is forced to make resti-
117. See, e.g., Farrell v. Shriver (In re Farrell), 43 Bankr. 115 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984),
in which the court declined to enjoin the state criminal prosecution. In Farrell, two arrest
warrants for the debtor were issued 11 days before the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The
debtor testified that neither the district attorney nor the creditor had offered to drop the
charges against him in exchange for restitution. The prosecutor testified that dismissal of
the charges would have been inappropriate due to the debtor's prior record, which included
two felony convictions. Id. at 116. The court stated:
The fresh start which Congress has provided under the Bankruptcy Act
means a financial fresh start and not a freedom to violate the criminal laws of
the State of Tennessee, seek a discharge in bankruptcy and cry immunity....
The public has an interest in every good faith criminal prosecution .... This
interest is of such a magnitude that it overrides the possibility that a bank-
ruptcy court can act as a haven for criminals.
Id. at 117.
118. 15 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981).
119. 37 Bankr. 383 (Bankr. C.D. 111. 1984).
120. 776 F.2d 30 (2d. Cir 1985). For a discussion of the mixed case law concerning
whether criminal restitution is a debt, and therefore dischargeable in bankruptcy, see Note,
In re Robinson: A Haven for Criminal Offenders, 37 MERCER L. REV. 1625 (1986).
121. Robinson, 776 F.2d at 40.
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tution.122 Not all courts hesitate to impose restitution as a proper
remedy. The United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits have upheld sentences of restitution.12 In Padg-
ett v. Latham,2 " a case in which the debtor sought injunctive relief
from criminal prosecution under section 524(a)(2), the bankruptcy
court refused to enjoin the state court from imposing criminal res-
titution. 2 5 The court in Padgett stated that a state court's order of
restitution was not synonymous with debt collection activities and
that "any sanction deemed appropriate by the state court in such
criminal proceedings does not contravene bankruptcy policy.' 26
Courts must consider the practical effect of a per se rule prohib-
iting restitution to creditors. First, a court's choice of remedies is
narrowed automatically. Second, a debtor may prefer restitution to
a fine or imprisonment. Moreover, although the bankruptcy courts
do not have the power to enjoin other courts, 27 enjoining the cred-
itor/complaining witness may effectively end the prosecution. If
the sole incentive of the creditor in pursuing the criminal proceed-
ing is to collect the discharged debt, he may lose interest in pursu-
ing the charge absent the chance of personal financial gain. With-
out the creditor, the prosecution loses its chief witness. 25 The
122. See Holder v. Dotson (In re Holder), 26 Bankr. 789, 791-92 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1982); Lawson v. Boczonadi (In re Lawson), 22 Bankr. 100, 104 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982);
Johnson v. Lindsey, 16 Bankr. 211, 213 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981).
123. United States v. Carson, 669 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1982); Barnett v. Evans, 673 F.2d.
1250 (11th Cir. 1982).
124. 37 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
125. Id. at 285.
126. Id. One commentator has argued that because restitution focuses on punishing and
rehabilitating the offender, rather than on compensating the victim, no conflict need exist
between a state order of restitution and a federal discharge in bankruptcy. Mehler, supra
note 59, at 834. This observation seems questionable because restitution is defined as "the
act of making good or giving equivalent for any loss, damage, or injury," BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1180 (5th ed. 1979), and "the restoration to a person of that of which he has been
wrongly deprived." BALLENTINF'S LAW DICTIoNARY 1107 (3d ed. 1969). Restitution thus fo-
cuses on compensating the victim, not on punishing the offender.
127. "[A] bankruptcy court shall have the powers of a court of equity, law; and admiralty,
but may not enjoin another court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the pres-
ence of the judge of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment." 28 U.S.C. §
1481 (1982).
128. See Hendel & Reinhardt, supra note 5, at 239 (in bad check cases, the complaining
witness or his agents generally are the only ones who can authenticate the debtor's signature
on the check).
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bankruptcy courts were not designed to shield a debtor from crimi-
nal prosecution.' 29 As one commentator notes, the courts must con-
sider carefully whether "excising the restitution feature of the
criminal sentence [will] cause the charges to be dropped and allow
the guilty to go free."'130
Imposing Fines Instead of Restitution
At least one court has advocated that the imposition of fines in-
stead of restitution is the better remedy.' 3' Three primary reasons
support this view. First, fines imposed in criminal proceedings and
payable to and for the benefit of a government unit are nondis-
chargeable.'32 Thus, imposition of a fine avoids the potential, sub-
sequent problem of determining whether criminal restitution is
dischargeable or nondischargeable. Second, imposition of a fine
rather than restitution prevents creditors from using the state
criminal courts as a public debt collection system. 3 3 The court in
Holder v. Dotson stated that "criminal statutes should be designed
to redress public, not private, wrongs."'3 4 Finally, proponents of
fines argue that restitution contravenes the rehabilitative purpose
of bankruptcy. 3 5 In fact, one court has ruled that a state bad
check statute requiring restitution was unconstitutional. 136
129. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
130. Rendelman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C.L. REv.
723, 740 (1980).
131. See Holder v. Dotson (In re Holder), 26 Bankr. 789 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982).
132.
A discharge under section 727, 1141, or 1328(b) of this title does not discharge
an individual debtor from any debt-... to the extent such debt is for a fine,
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit,
and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss. ...
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(7) (West Supp. 1987). See City of Memphis v. Wilson, 31 Bankr. 191
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1984) (applying § 423(a)(7)).
133. Holder, 26 Bankr. at 793.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 792.
136. In re Manier, Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH) 68,670 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980). The bank-
ruptcy court in In re Manier stated that requiring a state judge to impose restitution
thwarted the rehabilitative purpose of federal law in violation of the supremacy clause.
Bankruptcy Judge Jennings stated that the court's declaration did not prohibit criminal




Imposition of a fine, however, still saddles the bankrupt debtor
with a financial burden resulting from a criminal proceeding, and
this can impair his fresh start after bankruptcy. If a debtor must
pay, the unsatisfied creditor, rather than the state, seems the more
worthy recipient.
Using the Nondischargeability Provisions
Section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code concerns the effect of a dis-
charge in bankruptcy. Several courts have suggested that rather
than trying to evade the effect of 524(a)(2) on discharged debts,
creditors should focus their efforts on having certain debts de-
clared nondischargeable under section 523 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 37 One commentator has urged courts to "integrate the use
of their injunctive relief powers with the nondischargeability provi-
sions of section 523."'' 8 The court in Barnett v. K-Mart139 stated
that litigating the issue of dischargeability under section 523 of the
Code allows a creditor to protect himself "without running rough-
shod over immunities that the United States, acting through a spe-
cifically granted, exclusive power has chosen to give its citizens."" 0
The conflict between federal and state law also is resolved. If a
debt is nondischargeable, the state prosecution may proceed with-
out undermining provisions and policies of federal law. Section 523
excepts nine categories of debt from discharge in bankruptcy."'
Nondischargeable debts include certain taxes and customs," 2
money, goods, or credit falsely or fraudulently obtained," 3 un-
scheduled debts,"' debts incurred while acting in a fiduciary ca-
pacity or for defalcation, embezzlement, or misappropriation," 5
debts for willful and malicious conversion or injury by the
137. E.g., Barnett v. K-Mart (In re Barnett), 15 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); Anson
v. Hopkins, 9 Bankr. 741 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); Barth v. Broshot (In re Broshot), 4
Bankr. 151 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1980).
138. See Mehler, supra note 59, at 835-37.
139. 15 Bankr. 504.
140. Id. at 511 (quoting Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 184 (1961) (Black, J.
and Douglas, J., dissenting)).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1982), amended by 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a) (West Supp. 1987).
142. Id. § 523(a)(1).
143. Id. § 523(a)(2).
144. Id. § 523(a)(3).
145. Id. § 523(a)(4).
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debtor,146 alimony or child support, 147 fines and penalties payable
to the government,14 8 most government-backed student loans,' 49
and debts found nondischargeable in a previous bankruptcy
case. 50 The nondischargeability of certain categories of debts
serves the congressional intent that only the honest debtor be
given a fresh start in bankruptcy.' 5'
If creditors actively participate in the bankruptcy process, courts
avoid the conflict between federal policy and state interest caused
by a discharge under 524(a)(2). Subsection (c) of section 523 re-
quires a creditor who is owed a debt that may be excepted from
discharge under subsections (a)(2), (a)(4), or (a)(6) to initiate pro-
ceedings in bankruptcy court. 52 If the creditor does not act, the
debt is discharged.55 Furthermore, these exceptions are construed
narrowly against the creditor 4 and are confined to those plainly
146. Id. § 523(a)(6).
147. Id. § 523(a)(5).
148. Id. § 523(a)(7).
149. Id. § 523(a)(8).
150. Id. § 523(a)(9).
151. In re Oxford Investment Co., 246 F. Supp. 651, 653 (S.D. Cal. 1965); see also Inahara
v. Harris (In re Harris), 458 F. Supp. 238 (D. Or. 1976) (purpose of Bankruptcy Act to
discharge honest debts of honest debtors), afl'd, 587 F.2d 451 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 918 (1979). For a discussion of the various nondischargeability provisions, see Ber-
ger, Tax or Penalty? Dischargeable in Bankruptcy? 83 CoM. L.J. 79 (1978); Hinderks, Pre-
serving Tort Claims Against a Debtor in Bankruptcy; Tort-Based Exceptions to Discharge,
53 KAN. B.A.J. 31 (1984); Hoffman & Murray, Obligations that Cannot Be Erased, 5 FAM.
Anvoc. 18 (Winter 1983); Kalevitch, Educational Loans in Bankruptcy, 2 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
325 (1982); Kosel, Running the Gauntlet of "Undue Hardship-The Discharge of Student
Loans in Bankruptcy, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 457 (1981); Swann, Dischargeability of
Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REV. 231 (1976); Zaretsky, The Fraud
Exception to Discharge Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANK. L.J. 253 (1979).
152.
Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor shall be
discharged from a debt specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection (a)
of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owned,
and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted
from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as this case may be, of subsec-
tion (a) of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 523(c).
153. S. REP. No. 989, supra note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 5787.
154. See Houtman v. Mann (In re Houtman), 568 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1978); Shepherd v.
McDonald, 157 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 802 (1947); Quadra, Ltd. v.
Konchan (In re Konchan), 36 Bankr. 393 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); Finance One, Inc. v.
Scarbaci (In re Scarbaci), 34 Bankr. 344 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); French v. United States, 20
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expressed 5 5 because the purpose of bankruptcy is to provide finan-
cial relief to the debtor.
For a creditor to use the nondischargeability provisions of sec-
tion 523, the debt must fit one of the specific nondischargeable
provisions. In many of the 524(a)(2) discharge cases, the creditor
tries to collect on bad checks. 56 A diligent creditor seeking to have
the bad check debt declared nondischargeable would rely on sec-
tion 523(a)(2)(A), the fraud provision. Courts are split on whether
delivery of a check returned for insufficient funds is, by itself, suffi-
cient to sustain a determination of nondischargeability under sec-
tion 523(a)(2).
The majority of courts, relying on article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code 7 and the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v.
United States,58 have held that a bank check is not a financial
statement or a representation as to whether the check will be
honored upon presentment.'59 A number of courts, however, have
held that the tender of a check is an implied representation by the
Bankr. 155 (Bankr. D. Or. 1982); Sanitation Recycling, Inc. v. Jay Peak Lodging Ass'n, Inc.,
428 F. Supp. 1022 (D. Vt. 1977).
155. See Gleason v. Thow, 236 U.S. 558 (1915).
156. E.g. Redenbaugh v. Gahle (In re Redenbaugh), 37 Bankr. 383 (Bankr. C.D. Ill 1984);
Padgett v. La.tham (In re Padgett), 37 Bankr. 280 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); In re Goodman,
34 Bankr. 34 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
157. Relevant provisions of the U.C.C. include §§ 3-409(1), 3-412(1), 3-104(2)(b), and 3-
104(1)(b). One court has stated that "article 3 imposes no warranty that the drawer's ac-
count contains sufficient funds to pay the check upon presentment." Western Petroleum v.
Burgstaler (In re Burgstaler), 58 Bankr. 508, 513 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1986).
158. 458 U.S. 279 (1982). Justice Blackmun noted in his majority opinion that "a check is
not a factual assertion at all, and therefore cannot be characterized as 'true' or 'false'....
Each check did not.., make any representation as to the state of petitioner's bank bal-
ance." Id. at 284-85.
159. E.g., Newberry Feed and Farm Center v. Miller (In re Miller), 57 Bankr. 52 (Bankr.
D.S.C. 1985); WSE Warehouse v. Holmes (In re Holmes), 52 Bankr. 35 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1985); Timberline Sys. Inc. v. Hammet (In re Hammet), 49 Bankr. 533 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1985); Energy Marketing Co. v. Sutton (In re Sutton), 39 Bankr. 390 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.
1984); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Younesi (In re Younesi), 34 Bankr. 828
(Bankr. C.D. Ca. 1983); Heinold Commodities & Securities v. Hunt (In re Hunt), 30 Bankr.
425 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); American Bank & Trust v. Lamb (In re Lamb), 28 Bankr. 462
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1983); A.G. Edwards & Sons v. Paulk (In re Paulk), 25 Bankr. 913 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1982); Hill v. Murray (In re Murray), 7 Bankr. 899 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981); Save-
On Oil Co. v. Wise (In re Wise), 6 Bankr. 867 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
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maker that funds are available to honor the check when
presented.1
60
The majority position, holding that bad check debts are not per
se nondischargeable, seems the better view. The Supreme Court in
Neal v. Clark"6 held that fraud in the bankruptcy discharge provi-
sions meant "positive fraud, or fraud in fact, involving moral turpi-
tude or intentional wrong, . . .and not implied fraud . . .which
may exist without the imputation of bad faith or immorality.... A
different construction would be inconsistent with the liberal spirit
which pervades the entire bankrupty system.' 6 2 Declaring bad
check debts to be fraud per se and therefore not dischargeable is
inconsistent with a narrow interpretation of section 523(a) and
with the rehabilitative intent of the discharge effect of section 524.
According to the majority view, a debt is nondischargeable under
section 523(a)(2)(A) if a creditor shows that at the time value was
obtained, four conditions existed. First, the debtor employed
means to obtain value which he knew were false or which were in
reckless disregard of truth. Second, representation was made to
deceive or otherwise wrongfully induce the creditor. Third, the
creditor actually and reasonably relied on such representation, and
fourth, damage was sustained as result of representation. 63 Be-
cause most courts require a creditor to prove these elements in all
fraud cases,6 often by clear and convincing evidence,6 5 and be-
cause the nondischargeability provisions are construed strictly,'66
160. E.g., Frits Loonsten, Inc. v. Mullin (In re Mullin), 51 Bankr. 377 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
1985); Bear Stearns & Co. v. Kurdoghlian (In re Kurdoghlian), 30 Bankr. 500 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1985); Tate v. Tabers (In re Tabers), 28 Bankr. 679 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983); Monarch
Tile Mfg. v. Anderson (In re Anderson), 10 Bankr. 296 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1981).
161. 95 U.S. 704 (1877).
162. Id. at 709.
163. See De Bartolo v. Kyriazes (In re Kyriazes), 38 Bankr. 353, 354 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1983); Marine Midland Bank v. Drayer (In re Drayer), 29 Bankr. 831-833 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1983); Cuneo v. Smith (In re Smith), 25 Bankr. 396, 398 (Bankr. D. Md. 1982); Revelle
Motors, Inc. v. Spector (In re Spector), 22 Bankr. 226, 232 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1982).
164. See, e.g., Salecki v. Commonwealth (In re Salecki), 51 Bankr. 364 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1985).
165. See, e.g., Beneficial Finance Co. v. Jackson (In re Jackson), 32 Bankr. 549 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1983); Groat v. Toleikis (In re Toleikis), 19 Bankr. 944 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1982);
Thorp Credit and Thrift Co. v. Pommerer (In re Pommerer), 10 Bankr. 935 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1981).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48.
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the practical effect of using section 523(a)(3)(A) to avoid the in-
junctive bar on collection efforts under section 524(a)(2) is limited.
Even diligent creditors who file a timely objection to a debtor's
discharge in accordance with section 523(c) often fail to avoid the
sweeping effects of bankruptcy's discharge. The creditors in Wil-
son v. Estes,'167 for example, sought to exclude their claim from dis-
charge, contending that because the debtor had defrauded them
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, the obligation was nondis-
chargeable.6 8 However, the court determined that the relationship
between the parties was not within the nature of a trust necessary
to establish a fiduciary relationship and discharged the debtor."6 9
The original creditor in Kaping v. Oregon17 0 also failed to have its
claim for child support declared nondischargeable. The nondis-
chargeability provisions therefore allow courts to escape the fed-
eral-state conflict created by criminal prosecution of a bankrupt
debtor in only a limited number of situations.
CONCLUSION: SUGGESTING A BALANCING APPROACH
The bankruptcy courts essentially are courts of equity,"7' apply-
ing principles and rules of equity jurisprudence." 2 The Supreme
Court in Pepper v. Litton7 3 stated that these equitable principles
"have been invoked to the end that fraud will not prevail, that
substance will not give way to form, that technical considerations
will not prevent substantial justice from being done."174 In short,
the bankruptcy court must make decisions according to the equi-
ties of the case. Bankruptcy courts should approach with caution
any test or sweeping rule that would inhibit a court's broad powers
to render fair and equitable decisions and remedies. The shortcom-
ings of a blanket prohibition on imposing criminal restitution and
167. 30 Bankr. 91 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1983).
168. Id. at 93-94.
169. Id. at 94 n.5.
170. 13 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
171. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934).
172. Larson v. First State Bank, 21 F.2d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 1927).
173. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
174. Id. at 305. In Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966), the Supreme Court
stated, "There is an overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of
bankruptcy jurisdiction." Id. at 103.
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the limited applicability of using the nondischargeability provi-
sions have been discussed previously."7 5
Federal courts repeatedly have relied on the primary motivation
of the prosecution test or the bad faith-irreparable harm test to
address this federal-state conflict. The basic question all courts
have tried to answer is whether the criminal prosecution of the dis-
charged debtor is intended to promote the valid state interest of
enforcing criminal statutes or whether it is simply a debt collection
device. In order to answer this question properly, a court should
carefully examine the actions of the parties and the surrounding
circumstances in each case. Factors a court should consider include
whether the criminal proceedings were initiated before the debtor
filed bankruptcy, whether the state offered to drop the charges if
restitution to the creditor was made, whether the state maintained
an active interest in aggressively prosecuting the case, and whether
the prosecutor exercised independent judgment in pursuing the
case. Exercising independent judgment would include investigating
the validity of the charges, ascertaining whether any evidence sup-
ported the allegations, and, if possible, attempting to determine
the complaining witness's motivation in bringing the charges. After
examining these factors and carefully balancing the equities of the
case, a bankruptcy court must attempt to effectuate twin congres-
sional intents of affording a debtor a fresh financial start and not
allowing debtors to use bankruptcy as a haven from state criminal
action.
In other contexts, a case-by-case balancing approach might cause
greater uncertainty and delay in court proceedings. e7 6 Making an
equitable decision after evaluating relevant factors in a section
524(a)(2) case, however, should not cause any more uneven justice
than has resulted from courts relying on subjective testimony or
175. See supra text accompanying notes 118-22, 156-63.
176. Professor Redish has suggested a balancing approach to solve a federal-state conflict
in a nonbankruptcy context. In The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of
a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463, 485-87 (1978), Redish suggests that "federal courts
should balance, on a case-by-case basis, the danger of disruption to state proceedings
against the strength of the individual's need for immediate review by a federal tribunal."
Federal review is appropriate in three types of cases: first amendment issues, issues unlikely
to arise often in a state criminal proceeding and therefore unlikely to impinge greatly on the
state judicial process, and important or recurring issues that cannot be reviewed by a peti-
tion for habeas corpus.
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interpreting what constitutes bad faith. Creditors and debtors will
know the relevant criteria of a court's decisionmaking process.
Creditors must realize that a criminal prosecution can be pursued
only if it is free of the taint of debt collection. Debtors must be
aware that filing for bankruptcy will not prevent a valid state pros-
ecution. Most important, this flexible approach of examining
largely objective factors allows a federal court to protect both fed-
eral and state rights and policies as the equities of the case de-
mand. No court has held that section 524(a)(2) automatically bars
criminal prosecution of the debtor. This provision, however, should
prevent creditors from using state criminal actions to collect debts
properly discharged in federal bankruptcy court. Courts must in-
vestigate the circumstances of each case to ensure that unscrupu-
lous creditors and dishonest debtors do not abuse the bankruptcy
system.
Kent A. Bieberich
